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Casenotes
PURPORTED LEASE WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE
HELD TO CONSTITUTE A CONDITIONAL SALE
Beckwith Machinery Co. v. Matthews'
Plaintiff-appellant filed a petition in the receivership
proceedings of the Burnwell Coal Co. praying for the return of certain machinery then in the possession of defendant-appellee, the receiver for the Company. Plaintiff alleged that it had rented the machinery to the Company for
a specified time according to the provisions of a written
agreement signed by the parties, and that the lessee was
in default in payment of the rent.
The written agreement was captioned "Agreement for
Rental of Machinery." The rental term was to run for
eight months, during which the lessee agreed to pay a
total rental of $4,632, payable in regular monthly installments of $579 each.2 According to the agreement, the lessee
might extend the term by electing to retain the machinery
after the expiration of the lease and paying additional rent
of $579 each month thereafter. The lessee also was given
the option to purchase the machinery outright at any time
during the term for a total sum of $8,244.64, in which case
all prior payments of rent were to be applied to the purchase price. The lessee further agreed to insure the machinery for the benefit of the plaintiff-lessor, and to preserve it in good operating condition. The contract contained the usual provision giving the lessor the right to
repossess upon default in payment of the rent by the lessee.
It was also provided that title to the machinery shall at all
times "be and remain with the Owner unless transferred
by separate written instrument."
It was found that the life of the greater part of the machinery was approximately eight years. Testimony revealed that the parties had intended originally to enter into
an ordinary conditional sales contract for the sale of the
machinery, but that the Coal Company was unable to
make the 20% down payment required under wartime
Federal regulations. They, therefore, entered into the con1 57 A. 2d 796, 175 A. L. R. 1360 (Md. 1948).

9It is clear that the Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act, Md. Code
Supp. (1947), Art. 83, Secs. 116-140, does not apply to the contract since
Section 139 limits the provisions of the Act to goods having a cash price of
$2,000 or less.
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tract in question in the form of a lease with an option in
the lessee to purchase. It was conceded that the contract
had never been recorded, and that credit by third persons
had been extended to the Company after it had taken possession of the machinery.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the
lower court, held that the agreement constituted a conditional sale, and that the reservation of title in the plaintiff was void as against the defendant, under Code, Article
21, Section 71,3 which provided in part, as follows:
"Every note, sale or contract for the sale of goods
and chattels, wherein the title thereto, or a lien thereon, is reserved until the same be paid in whole or in
part, or the transfer of title is made to depend upon
any condition therein expressed and possession is to
be delivered to the vendee, shall, in respect to such
reservation and condition, be void as to third parties
without notice until such note, sale or contract be in
writing, signed by the vendee, and be recorded....
The Court stated that in deciding whether a particular
transaction is or is not a conditional sale, it would look to
the substance of the agreement, and disregard, if necessary,
the external form with which the parties had clothed it.'
The Court thus points out that:
"In determining whether or not a given instrument
is a conditional sales contract, we must find what the
intention of the parties was at the time it was entered
into. The situation of the parties, their purpose, the
thing they sought to accomplish, and the method employed, are all important. Once the intention of the
8Md. Code (1939) ; since amended, see infra, n. 4.
'This section was amended in 1949 by Md. Laws 1949, Ch. 430. Instead of
"third parties without notice" (as in the former statute), the amended
statute specifies that such parties shall include "subsequent purchasers,
mortgagees, incumbrancers, landlords with liens, pledgees, receivers, and
creditors who acquired a lien by judicial proceedings on such goods and
chattels without notice . . ."
See Arnold, Conditional Sales of Chattels in Maryland, 1 Md. L. Rev.
190-193 (1937), for a discussion of Maryland cases distinguishing between
conditional sales and other transactions. In Sturtevant Co. v. Dugan and
Co., 106 Md. 587, 68 A. 351 (1907), a case involving goods consigned for sale
to a factor, (and in which the rights of innocent third parties were not
involved), the Court, at page 618 said:
"The distinction between bailment and sale is not difficult of ascertainment, if due regard be had to the elements peculiar to each. In bailment, the identical thing delivered is to be restored, or the proceeds
after sale. In a sale there is an agreement express or implied to pay
money or its equivalent for the thing delivered and there is no obligation to return." See Arnold, op. cit., aupia, 192.
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parties becomes clear, it is immaterial what the instrument is called, nor how skillfully the real intention
of the parties is disguised."
The intent of the parties to effect a sale, and not a
lease, was shown by the fact that the "lessee" was obligated
to pay 56% of the purchase price as "rental." A rent so
disproportionate to the real rental value of the property
during the relatively short term would "virtually compel
the lessee to buy. No solvent operators would
take such a
7
loss, and the only alternative was to buy."
The writer has been unable to find another case in
which the Court of Appeals has been called upon to hold
that an instrument which on its face purported to be a
lease with an option to purchase was in fact a conditional
sale. However, the United States District Court of Maryland had previously been faced with the same contention
in In re Rainey.8 The "lease" in that case provided that
machinery, valued at $812, was to be leased for a term of
three months, that the lessee would pay $325 as "partial
security" for the fulfillment of the agreement, and that the
$487 balance was to be paid in two monthly payments of
$243.50 each. The lessee had the option after the expiration
of the term to purchase the machinery upon payment to the
lessor of the amount deposited as security. The agreement
was held to be a conditional sale, the Court, speaking
through Judge Coleman, stating:
"In order to determine the true character of the
agreement, it is necessary to look through form to
substance. In the present case, the rental of the machinery for three months, the full term of the lease
amounted to 60% of its entire value. A charge so disproportionate to the term of user in relation to the
value of the articles, all of which were secondhand,
in and of itself certainly suggests a sale." 9
A somewhat unusual arrangement was before the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals in Enterp'rise Fuel
Supra, n. 1, 801.
"Ibid., 800. Cases cited in the opinion were: In re Rainey, 31 F. 2d 197
(D. C. Md., 1929) ; In re Munger Fish Co., 9 F. 2d 54 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ;
Phelan v. Stockyards Bank, 134 Oki. 13, 276 P. 175 (1928) ; Hervey v. Rhode
Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876) ; Arter v. Jacobs, 226 App.
Div. 343, 234 N. Y. S. 357 (1929) ; Loeb Piano Co. v. Kessler, 18 La. App. 491,

140 So. 398 (1932).
831 F. 2d 197. See discussion In Arnold, opA c.,

'bM4, IM.

supra, n. 5, 198.
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Co. v. Jones, ° on appeal from the United States District
Court for Maryland. The appellant, in this case, had entered
into a contract with the appellee to sell him a certain
quantity of coal at a fixed price, and to furnish him with
an Iron Fireman Automatic Coal Stoker. At the conclusion
of the contract for the purchase of coal, he agreed to convey title to the coal stoker to appellee. The court, in a
per curiam opinion, held that the arrangement constituted
a conditional sale, and not a lease, of the coal stoker.
Almost all of the courts in this country which have
considered the question have held that the legal significance of a particular transaction under the conditional
sales recording statutes is to be determined by the real
intent and purpose of the parties irrespective of the label
they place upon it." Thus, even though an agreement be
called a lease or a bailment, the courts will hold it to be a
conditional sale if the parties contemplate that the ultimate
owner of the property will be the lessee or the bailee, or
where such ownership will, as a practical certainty, result
because of the nature of the agreement and the circumstances of the case.'2 Pennsylvania stands practically alone
in taking a contrary view." The Pennsylvania rule, as
stated in 17 American Law Reports at page 1441 is as follows:
1099 F. 2d 928 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), 38 Am. Bankr. Rep. N. S. 10.

6 Am. Jur., Bailments, Sec. 35, 197. See Levin, The Intention Fallacy in
the Construction of Title Retaining Contracts, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 130-149
(1925), pointing out that the courts have uniformly stated that the intention of the parties controls, but that when the rights of innocent third
parties are involved, the courts will in fact ignore the subjective intent of
the contracting parties and apply a test of "external" analysis based upon
the public policy as expressed in the statute. See also 17 A. L. R. 1421:
"In general it may be said that the character of the contract depends
upon the intention of the parties but this general rule is apt to be misleading, since such contracts are frequently construed contrary to the
express statement therein as to the character thereof. The court looks
to the purpose sought to be attained by the contract and to the surrounding facts and circumstances, and construes it in accordance therewith, as
well as in harmony with the general cases applicable to the rights enjoyed and obligations imposed by it."
1 See: 2 WnLuSTON, SALES (Rev. Ed., 1948), Se. 336; 6 Am. Jur. (Rev.
Ed., 1950), Bailments, Secs. 35-8, 197-201; 47 Am. Jur., Sales, Sec. 836, 23-6.
Cases annotated in 17 A. L. R. 1434, 1435; 43 A. L. R. 1257 ; 92 A. L. R. 321,
323 ; 175 A. L. R. 1382, 1384. See also note to Purity Creamery Co. v. Hays,
4 S. W. 2d 1056 (Texas Civ. App., 1928), in 7 Texas L. Rev. 329 (1929) ; and
Dalzell, Lease - Contracts as a Means of Conveying Title to Chattels, 1 Ore.
L. Rev. 9-21 (1921), (reviewing Oregon cases).
13Pennsylvania early held that a conditional sale was valid only as between the parties. Martin v. Mathiot, 14 S. & R. 214 (Pa., 1826). This holding led to the adoption of the Pennsylvania "bailment-lease" device, which
was upheld as against innocent third parties although it was In substance
nothing but a conditional sale. The Pennsylvania cases are separately annotated in 17 A. 16 IL 1441, 48 A. LT . 1259, 92 A. L. R. 330, and 175 A. ,. R.
1887.
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"In Pennsylvania the rule obtains that if a party
receives the possession of goods under an agreement
that he is to retain them for a definite period of time,
and if, at or before the expiration of that period, he
pays for them, he is to become the owner,-otherwise
to pay for the use of them,- this constitutes a bailment, and the title to the property, even as against
creditors, remains in the bailor."' 4
The Court of Appeals in Beckwith Machinery Co. v.
Matthews 15 expressly repudiated and refused to follow the
Pennsylvania rule.
All the authorities agree that a bailment or lease of personal property with an option in the lessee or bailee to purchase is not ipso facto to be regarded as a conditional sale.16
However, the facts of a particular case may be such that
the court is warranted in holding that such a lease or bailment is merely an attempt to disguise what the parties
really intend to be a conditional sale. If the so-called lessee
or bailee is bound to pay as "rent" an amount substantially
equal to the full purchase price, and if, after payment of
the last installment, or upon the exercise of an option to
purchase for a purely nominal sum, title is to vest in him,
the courts (except for Pennsylvania) uniformly view the
agreement to be a conditional sale. 7 Of course, an agreement will not be construed as a conditional sale if the total
purchase price far exceeds the rent which the lessee is
bound to pay,"8 even though he has the option to purchase
the property and apply all prior payments to the purchase
price.
And although an agreement provides that the lessee or
bailee will pay an amount equal to the full purchase price,
and that title will vest in him after the last installment is
paid, the agreement will not be held to constitute a condi"Judge Coleman in In re Rainey, supra.. n. 8, termed the Pennsylvania
rule "an anomaly in the law". Pennsylvania in 1925 adopted the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, so that conditional sales in Pennsylvania are no
longer void as to all third parties. However, the "bailment-lease" device
still persists. See infra, n. 26.
57 A. 2d 796, supra, n. 1.
"WILLISTON, loc. cit. supra, n. 12; 6 Am. Jur. (Rev. Ed., 1950), Bailments, Sec. 36, 197-8; 8 C. J. S., Bailments, See. 42, 325.
1717 A. L. R. 1435, 43 A. L. R. 1257, and other authorities cited, supra, n. 12.
See also Commissioner's Note to Sec. 1 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act,
2 Uniform Laws Ann., 2-4.
"See, as examples: Lambert Engine Co. v. Carmody, 79 Conn. 419, 65 A.
141 (1906); Cutler Mail Chute Co. v. Crawford, 167 App. Div. 246, 152
N. Y. S. 750 (1915) ; In re National Engineering and Equipment Co., 256 F.
985 (D. C., W. D. Wash., N. D. 1918).
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tional sale if he can terminate the transaction at any time
by returning the property.9 The lessee-bailee, in such a
"hire-purchase"20 contract, is not really bound to make any
payments at all, and the transfer of title to him is is not a
probable or necessary consequence of the contract.
The great majority of the courts have also held that an
agreement in the form of a lease or bailment with an
option to purchase is to be construed as a conditional sale
if the "rental" is greatly in excess of the fair rental value
of the property for the term of the lease.2 1 In such cases,
the length of the term, the total purchase price, and the
probable "life expectancy" of the property are of especial
importance. If the court finds that the lessee will as a
matter of sound business practice be virtually compelled
to exercise the option to purchase, the transaction will be
held to constitute a conditional sale, even though it may
not be found that the lessee was bound in the first instance
to pay an amount equal or substantially equal to the purchase price.22 In the Beckwith case,23 the Court clearly
recognized this principle, and, it is submitted, properly applied it to the facts of the case. Although the sum that
the Coal Co. was bound to pay amounted to but 56% of
the total price (and was not therefore "substantially equal"
to the price of the machinery), the Court found that it
was nevertheless so much greater than the fair rental
value as to practically compel the lessee to exercise his
option to purchase the property.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act, 2 (enacted in ten
states, but not in Maryland) ,25 clearly recognizes that certain leases and bailments like those discussed above are
nothing more than conditional sales in disguise. In Section
One of the Act, a conditional sale is defined as follows:
"In this Act 'Conditional sale' means (1) any contract for the sale of goods under which possession is
delivered to the buyer and the property in the goods
is to vest in the buyer at a subsequent time upon the
payment of part or all of the price, or upon the per"Helby v. Matthews, 1895 A. C. 471; Southern Music House v. Dusenbury,
27 S. C. 464, 4 S. E. 60 (1887) ; Ludden and Bates Southern Music House v.
Hornsby, 45 S. C. 111, 22 S. E. 781 (1895) ; In re Ignelzi, 48 F. 2d 297 (D. C.,
W. D. Pa. 1930) ; McCall v. Powell, 64 Ala. 254 (1879).
'06 Am. Jur. (Rev. Ed., 1950), Bailments, Sec. 35, 197.
Authorities cited, supra, n. 12.
'*In re Rainey, supra, n. 8, is a good example.
2157 A. 2d 796, supra, n. 1.
"12 Uniform Laws Ann., Cond. Sales, 1-2.
2
1Ariz. (1919), Del. (1919), Ind. (1935), N. H. (1945), N. J. (1919), N. Y.
(1922), Pa. (1925), S. D. (1919), W. Va. (1925), Wisc. (1919).
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formance of any other condition or the happening of
any contingency; or (2) any contract for the bailments
or leasing of goods by which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum substantially
equivalent to the value of the goods, and by which it
is agreed that the bailee or lessee is bound to become,
or has the option of becoming the owner of such goods
upon full compliance with the terms of the contract." 6
The conditional sales recording statutes in seven other
states27 classify, as conditional sales, leases and bailments
substantially like those defined in subsection (2) above of
the Uniform Act.
In this connection, it might also be noted that the Maryland Retail Installment Sales Act2 s includes within its
definition of installment sales agreements
"... any contract for the bailment or leasing of
goods under which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay
as compensation a sum substantially equivalent to or
in excess of the value of the goods...,.
The Beckwith case,3" definitely aligns Maryland with
the great weight of judicial authority in this country.
Moreover, the decision appears to reach a desirable result
from the standpoint of sound public policy. The recording statutes are designed to protect innocent third parties
who may justifiably rely on another's apparent ownership
of property when the records fail to disclose the true
ownership. The conditional vendor, who delivers possession
of valuable personal property to another can always protect
himself by a prompt recording of the contract. Where the
rights of innocent third persons are involved, public policy
can best be served by looking to the substance of the agreement, and by refusing to uphold any attempted circumvention of the recording statutes.
" In Pennsylvania subsection two was omitted for the purpose of preserving the validity of the Pennsylvania "bailment-lease" device as against third
parties.
MAla., Iowa, Me., Mo., Ohio, Wash., and Wyo.
28Supra, n. 2.
2 Ibid., Sec. 139(b).
See also a like definition in Section 151(c) of Article
83 (1947 Supp.).
8057 A. 2d 796, supra, n. 1.

